Opinions in the California Supreme Court Concerning the Anti-SLAPP Statute (CCP § 425.16)
California Supreme Court, 2006 (review of Alameda Co. Superior Court)
40 Cal.4th 33, 146 P.3d 510
Court's opinion limits liability for Internet defamation. The decision holds that Internet users and providers are immune from civil liability for reposting third party content on the Internet.
California Supreme Court, 1999 (review of Alameda Co. Superior Court)
19 Cal.4th 1106, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471
The Briggses, landlords, sued a nonprofit organization that provides counseling, mediation, and referral services related to
landlord-tenant disputes, alleging that the organization harassed and defamed him. The trial court granted defendant's special motion to strike the complaint. The appellate court reversed in a 2-1 decision, finding no "issue of public significance" in the defendant's conduct. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal, holding that the anti-SLAPP statute is to be construed broadly and covers any lawsuit arising from the exercise of the right to petition the government, regardless of the issue involved.
California Supreme Court, 2002 (review of Sonoma Co. Superior Court)
29 Cal.4th 69, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 519, 52 P.3d 695
| Note! This case was reviewed together with Navellier v. Sletten and Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. |
A city's action for declaratory relief respecting the constitutionality of its ordinance, filed in state court in response to a similar action filed by citizens in federal court, does not constitute a SLAPP and is not subject to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.
California Supreme Court, 2008(review of San Francisco Co. Superior Court)
45 Cal.4th 309, 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 288
(Case summary in preparation.)
California Supreme Court, 2009(review of Orange Co. Superior Court)
45 Cal.4th 467, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 275
(Case summary in preparation.)
California Supreme Court, 2002 (review of Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
29 Cal.4th 53, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507, 52 P.3d 685
| Note! This case was reviewed together with Navellier v. Sletten and City of Cotati v. Cashman |
The party moving to strike a complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute is not required to demonstrate that the action was brought with the intent to chill the exercise of constitutional speech or petition rights.
California Supreme Court, 2006 (review of Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
39 Cal. 4th 299, 46 Cal. Rptr.3d 606
(Case summary in preparation.)
California Supreme Court, 2004 (review of San Diego Co. Superior Court)
34 Cal.4th 679, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 663
Gates had been convicted of accessory after the fact to a murder and served three years in prison. Several years later Discovery produced a program about the crime, portraying Gates's involvement. After the program was broadcast, Gates sued Discovery for defamation and invasion of privacy. The trial court granted Discovery's demurrer to the defamation cause of action but denied its demurrer to the complaint for invasion of privacy. Discovery then filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the latter complaint; the court denied the motion, finding that Discovery had failed to demonstrate that its account of the crime was newsworthy, thus making it likely that Gates would prevail on his complaint for invasion of privacy. The appellate court's reversal was upheld, since Discovery's report is protected by the First Amendment and current case law would make it impossible for Gates to prevail on his claim.
California Supreme Court, 2003 (review of Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
31 Cal.4th 728, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 636
The court affirms the Court of Appeal's decision that a malicious prosecution action is not exempt from scrutiny under the state's anti-SLAPP law.
California Supreme Court, 2001 (review of Marin Co. Superior Court)
24 Cal.4th 1122, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 377
Ketchum sued his tenant Moses for allegedly filing false reports with government agencies about the condition of Ketchum's property.
Moses prevailed on a special motion to strike Ketchum's complaint. Moses had a contingency fee contract with his attorney; if the
anti-SLAPP motion failed, the attorney would receive no fee. The trial court awarded attorney's fees, as required by the anti-SLAPP statute, and included a fee enhancement to reflect the risk of nonpayment in a contingency contract. It later supplemented this award with additional fees and costs after Ketchum attempted to challenge the fee award. The Court of Appeal reversed. The Supreme Court affirms the judgement of the Court of Appeal but criticizes the rationale of the Court of Appeal. A successful movant of an anti-SLAPP motion is entitled not only to attorney fees incurred in the pursuit of the anti-SLAPP motion, but also to fees incurred in litigating the award of attorney fees. While attorney fees incurred in pursuit of an anti-SLAPP motion may be enhanced to reflect contingent risk, fees incurred after a successful motion may not be so enhanced because an award of fees is mandatory under the anti-SLAPP statute and therefore there is no risk of nonpayment.
California Supreme Court, 2006 (review of Inyo Co. Superior Court)
39 Cal.4th 192, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 41
(Case summary in preparation.)
California Supreme Court, 2002 (review of San Mateo Co. Superior Court)
29 Cal.4th 82, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d 703
| Note! This case was reviewed together with Equilon Enterprises, LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc. and City of Cotati v. Cashman |
Plaintiffs sued Sletten for a variety of causes, including breach of contract for filing counterclaims in an earlier lawsuit in federal court. Sletten moved to strike this cause of action as a SLAPP, claiming that his counterclaims were protected under the First Amendment's right of petition. The Court of Appeal (in an unpublished decision) concluded that Sletten's counterclaims were not a "valid exercise" of that right, as required by the anti-SLAPP statute, since he had earlier waived his right to sue Navellier in a "release of claims" as a condition of return to employment. The Supreme Court reverses, holding that Sletten had met his threshold burden of demonstrating that Navellier's action for breach of contract "is one arising from the type of speech and petitioning activity that is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute." (See follow-on decision in Navellier v. Sletten, First District Court of Appeal.)
California Supreme Court, 2006 (review of Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
37 Cal. 4th 1048, 39 Cal. Rptr.3d 516
Rusheen sued Cohen for abuse of process, for allegedly filing false declarations on the issue of service, and conspiring to execute
the resulting default judgment against Rusheen. Cohen filed an anti-SLAPP motion, asserting that Cohen's conduct was privileged under Civil Code section 47(b) as communications in the course of a judicial proceeding. The trial court agreed and granted the motion. The appellate court reversed on the grounds that executing on the improper default judgment was unprivileged, noncommunicative conduct.
The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the anti-SLAPP motion should have been granted. It concluded that where the gravamen of the complaint is a privileged communication (i.e., allegedly perjured declarations of service) the privilege extends to necessarily related noncommunicative acts (i.e., act of levying).
California Supreme Court, 2006 (review of Santa Barbara Co. Superior Court)
39 Cal. 4th 374, 46 Cal. Rptr.3d 360
(Case summary in preparation.)
California Supreme Court, 2006 (review of Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
39 Cal.4th 260, 46 Cal. Rptr.3d 638
(Case summary in preparation.)
California Supreme Court, 2007 (review of Monterey Co. Superior Court)
40 Cal.4th 683, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 775
(Case summary in preparation.)
California Supreme Court, 2005 (review of Santa Clara Co. Superior Court)
35 Cal. 4th 180, 25 Cal. Rptr.3d 298
"The perfecting of an appeal from the denial of a special motion to strike automatically stays all further trial court proceedings on the merits upon the causes of action affected by the motion."
California Supreme Court, 2009 (review of Solano Co. Superior Court)
___ Cal.4th ___, ___ Cal.Rptr.3d ____
(Case summary in preparation.)
California Supreme Court, 2002 (review of Riverside Co. Superior Court)
28 Cal. 4th 811, 123 Cal. Rptr.2d 19
| Note! Opinion overruled by Assembly Bill 1158 (2005), amending Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16(b)(3). |
The issue presented is whether, in an action for malicious prosecution, denial of an anti-SLAPP motion in the underlying action establishes that there was probable cause to support the action, thus precluding a suit for malicious prosecution. The court says it does when the denial is predicated on a finding that the action had potential merit.
California Supreme Court, 2004 (review of Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
32 Cal. 4th 958, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54, 87 P.3d 802
The tort of malicious prosecution includes continuing to prosecute a lawsuit discovered to lack probable cause. (This decision expands the tort, which previously was limited to commencing an action without probable cause.) Evidence to this effect is sufficient to defeat a special motion to strike a complaint for malicious prosecution.
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