Opinions in the California Courts of Appeal Concerning the Anti-SLAPP Statute (CCP § 425.16)
Court of Appeal, 2nd District, 2003 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
107 Cal.App.4th 568, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 789
Plaintiff sued Steinberg for business damages, alleging that Steinberg had colluded with plaintiff's former employee to promote legislative action adverse to plaintiff's business by facilitating meetings between the former employee and representatives of
professional associations. The trial court granted Steinberg's anti-SLAPP motion to strike the entire complaint on the grounds that
the cause of action was conduct "in furtherance of free speech or petition in connection with a public issue" and plaintiff had not
demonstrated a probability of prevailing on its complaint, including counts of inducing breach contract and inducing breach of fiduciary duties. The appellate court affirms.
Court of Appeal, 1st District, 2008 (on appeal from San Francisco Co. Superior Court)
160 Cal.App.4th 1467, 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 1
(Case summary in preparation.)
A.F. Brown Electrical Contractor, Inc. v. Rhino Electric Supply, Inc.
Court of Appeal, 2nd District, 2003 (on appeal from Orange Co. Superior Court)
137 Cal.App.4th 1118, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 1
(Case summary in preparation.)
American Humane Association v. Los Angeles Times Communications
Court of Appeal, 2nd District, 2001 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
92 Cal.App.4th 1095, 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 488
Plaintiff sought declaratory relief to prevent the LA Times from using a confidential internal report about conflicts of interest in the plaintiff organization. The trial court's denial of a special motion to strike the complaint is reversed. In the published portion of its opinion, the appellate court addresses the question of the timing of a request for attorney fees and costs.
Court of Appeal, 1st District, 2005 (on appeal from Contra Costa Co. Superior Court)
128 Cal.App.4th 1569, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 863
Ampex sued an anonymous Internet poster for defamation and the poster responded with an anti-SLAPP motion. Once the poster was
identified as Cargle, Ampex dismissed the suit and refiled the action in New York. The appellate court in an earlier opinion ruled that the trial court had jurisdiction to rule on the anti-SLAPP motion even after dismissal. In this opinion the court holds that Cargle was the prevailing party in the trial court and was therefore entitled to attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP statute.
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2004 (on appeal from San Diego Co. Superior Court)
119 Cal.App.4th 1146, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 100
This case arose from highly publicized and controversial litigation concerning the validity of "second-parent" adoptions. The parties were domestic partners. Sharon bore two children by artificial insemination during the relationship. Annette successfully petitioned
the court to adopt the first child as a second parent. After the couple separated Annette filed a legal action to adopt the second child. Following that action, Annette sued Sharon for defamation arising from statements made by Sharon in a letter to an advocacy organization. The trial court's denial of a special motion to strike the complaint is reversed. The trial court ruled that the action arose from constitutionally protected speech but concluded that Annette had established a probability of prevailing on her claim. The appellate court disagrees on the grounds that Annette is a public figure by virtue of the public controversy surrounding the adoption proceedings and cannot prove the actual malice required of public figures alleging defamation.
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2009 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
171 Cal.App.2 Dist. 598, 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 133
(Case summary in preparation.)
Applied Business Software, Inc. v. Pacific Mortgage Exchange, Inc.
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2008 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
164 Cal.App.4th 1108, 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 849
(Case summary in preparation.)
ARP Pharmacy Services, Inc. v. Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc.
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2006 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
138 Cal.App.4th 1307, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 371
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 1996 (on appeal from Orange Co. Superior Court)
42 Cal.App.4th 1170, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 62
Averill publicly criticized a plan by a charitable organization to convert a house in her neighborhood into a shelter for battered
women. After she attempted to pursuade her employer not to contribute to the charity, the charity sued her for slander solely for her
comments to her employer. The lower court's denial of Averill's special motion to strike the complaint is reversed. The appellate court holds that comments made in private, if made in connection with a public issue, are protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2009 (on appeal from San Diego Co. Superior Court)
173 Cal.App.4th 1325, 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 782
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2006 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
135 Cal.App.4th 654, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 688
Plaintiff filed a complaint for malicious prosecution against Michael Larivee and the Quisenberry Law Firm. The trial court allowed
Larivee to join in the Quisenberry Law Firm's special motion to strike and granted the motion even though the hearing was held more
than 30 days after service. Affirming the lower court's ruling, the appellate court found the hearing to be timely and held
that joinder to a special motion to strike is effective as long as the joining defendant demonstrates that the action arises out of protected First Amendment activity.
Court of Appeal, 3rd District, 2003 (on appeal from Sacramento Co. Superior Court)
110 Cal.App.4th 82, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 454
Plaintiff sued his insurer, alleging bad faith in handling his claim because of delay. The company filed an anti-SLAPP motion to
strike the complaint, arguing that, because the claim was eventually submitted to arbitration, the company's processing of the claim was an exercise of its right of petition under the First Amendment and therefore protected by both the anti-SLAPP statute and the "litigation privilege" (Civil Code § 47(b)). The trial court denied the motion and the appellate court affirms. According to the court, the cause of action lies in nonaction and delays, not in any specific statement or writing by the company, and none of this conduct involved the company's right of petition. Moreover, "the fact that a dispute exists that might ultimately lead to arbitration does not make every step in that dispute part of a right to petition."
Court of Appeal, 2nd District, 1996 (on appeal from Ventura Co. Superior Court)
44 Cal.App.4th 944, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 357
Beilenson defeated Sybert in an election for U.S. Congress. After the election Sybert sued Beilenson, a campaign worker, a consulting firm, and a campaign committee, alleging that Beilenson distributed libelous campaign literature. The lower court's denial of Beilenson's special motion to strike the complaint is reversed. The appellate court holds that the anti-SLAPP statute protects statements by candidates for public office and their supporters.
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2004 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
123 Cal.App.4th 1179, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 621
Benasra sued lawyers who represented his business rival while still representing him, alleging breach of duty of loyalty. The trial
court granted defendants' anti-SLAPP motion. The court reverses, holding that the court's earlier decision in Jespersen v. Zubiate-Beauchamp — that a claim for legal malpratice is not subject to an anti-SLAPP motion to strike a complaint -- applies to a complaint alleging breach of attorney duty of loyalty.
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2003 (on appeal from San Diego Co. Superior Court)
106 Cal.App.4th 978, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 364
While Benitez was being treated for infertility at NCWCMG's facility, she told her doctor she was a lesbian. Subsequently she encountered difficulties in receiving infertility treatment at NCWCMG. Benitez sued on a variety claims. Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP
motion, on which the trial court did not rule. On appeal, Benitez argued that the motion is without merit and should be denied. The
appellate court refuses to consider the issue on the grounds that there is no appealable order from the trial court.
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2005 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
129 Cal.App.4th 11, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 112
Bergman sued attorney Drum for malicious prosecution of a case against her, and in response Drum filed an anti-SLAPP motion. The
motion was denied and then affirmed in an earlier appeal, in which the appellate court concluded that Bergman had demonstrated a likelihood of prevailing on her claim. Thereafter the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant. In this appeal the court holds that the doctrine of the law of the case precluded summary judgment for the defendant because summary judgement was inconsistent with the appellate court's previous ruling concerning the anti-SLAPP motion.
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2004 (on appeal from San Diego Co. Superior Court)
115 Cal.App.4th 322, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 197
Plaintiffs sued Planned Parenthood under California's Unfair Competition Law (Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq.), alleging
that its websites contained "unlawful, unfair, confusing, and misleading statements" concerning abortion, and seeking injunctive
relief. Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion, which was granted by the trial court after plaintiffs were unable to show a reasonable
probability of prevailing on their claims for injunctive relief. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that the state's anti-SLAPP statute is
unconstitutional on its face. The appellate court rejects all of plaintiffs' arguments and affirms the order granting the anti-SLAPP
motion.
Court of Appeal, 1st District, 2007 (on appeal from San Francisco Co. Superior Court)
156 Cal.App.4th 275, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 190
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2004 (on appeal from San Diego Co. Superior Court)
116 Cal.App.4th 460, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 696
Blackburn obtained an undivided one-half interest in property co-owned by Brady and his partner Lanser at public auction in partial
satisfaction of a money judgment against Lanser. In this action for partition Blackburn also alleges fraud, that Brady and Lanser conspired to drive up the value of the land at auction. Brady filed a special motion to strike the complaint for fraud, arguing that his written bid and any oral statements made at the auction were made in connection with an official proceeding, i.e., Brady's lawsuit against Lanser, and thus was protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court denied the motion and the appellate court affirms. The court agrees with existing case law that the anti-SLAPP statute does not protect every act having any connection, however remote, with an official proceeding. In order for statements or writings to be protected by the statute they must be made in connection with "an issue under consideration or review" in the proceeding.
Court of Appeal, 2nd District, 2004 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
123 Cal.App.4th 903, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 385
DIRECTV sent letters to thousands of people who purchased devices that can pirate DIRECTV's television signals, demanding that
the recipients cease using the devices. Several recipients of these demand letters filed a complaint against DIRECTV, alleging that the
mailing of the demand letters was an unfair business practice (Business & Professions Code, § 17200). DIRECTV filed an anti-SLAPP motion,
which the trial court granted. The appellate court affirms, holding that the provision of the state's anti-SLAPP statute that excludes
public interest lawsuits does not apply to the plaintiff-purchasers' action, and DIRECTV is entitled to have the complaint stricken.
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2007 (on appeal from Orange Co. Superior Court)
155 Cal.App.4th 1366, 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 733
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 2nd District, 1996 (on appeal from Ventura Co. Superior Court)
49 Cal.App.4th 1108, 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 207
A deputy sheriff shot and killed a citizen during execution of a search warrant. Following an investigation by the district attorney,
the deputy was exonerated. However, the DA's public report of the investigation questioned the veracity of the affidavit supporting the
search warrant. The deputy sued the district attorney for slander. The trial court's denial of the district attorney's special motion to strike the complaint is reversed. Held: the state's anti-SLAPP statute applies to public employees who issue reports and comment on issues of public interest relating to their official duties. Moreover, public entities are "persons" for the purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute and thus entitled to recover attorney fees when they prevail on a special motion to strike a complaint.
Court of Appeal, 1st District, 1997 (on appeal from San Francisco Co. Superior Court)
52 Cal.App.4th 1036, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 58
The director of a hospital training center at the University of California at San Francisco sued a newspaper for defamation over a
series of five published articles about allegations of malfeasance at the center. The trial court's granting of the newspaper's special
motion to strike the complaint is upheld. The appellate court interprets both the anti-SLAPP statute and Civil Code section 47
(immunizing participants in "official proceedings or litigation" from liability for tort actions), concluding that a State Auditor's report on the training center, which was summarized in one of the newspaper's articles, qualified as an "official public proceeding" within the meaning of
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2004 (on appeal from San Diego Co. Superior Court)
116 Cal.App.4th 679, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 702
Brenton sued for product liability and other causes of tort action, alleging that she suffered a psychotic breakdown after using a
Metabolife product. She also alleged that Metabolife's false advertising and misbranding of the product violated the state's unfair
business practices statute (Business & Professions Code § 17200). Metabolife moved to strike the entire complaint as a SLAPP, arguing
that Brenton's complaint targeted protected commercial speech. The trial court denied the motion and the appellate court affirms.
According to the court, the specific issue in this case is a recurring one: whether a claim against a manufacturer for physical injury,
allegedly caused by use of its product, is subject to the anti-SLAPP statute merely because the manufacturer also engaged in commercial
speech to market the product. The court rejects Metabolife's argument that its labeling and advertising of the product are protected by the anti-SLAPP statute because they constitute, in the statute's terms, written statements made in a place open to the public in connection with an issue of public interest. In addition, the court holds that the newly enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17 (effective Jan. 1, 2004) expressly removes Brenton's complaint for unfair business practices from the anti-SLAPP statute's protection. (Section 425.17 provides that the anti-SLAPP motion to strike a complaint cannot be applied to "any cause of action brought against a person primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or services, ... arising from any statement or conduct by that person," as long as certain conditions are met.) The court rejects Metabolife's argument that section 425.17 is unconstitutional because it cannot withstand the strict scrutiny standard articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Publ. Serv. Comm'n (1980). (See also Martinez v. Metabolife International, Inc., 4th District Court of Appeal (2003); Scott v. Metabolife International, Inc., 3rd District Court of Appeal (2004).)
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2005 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
132 Cal.App.4th 324, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 371
74 affiliated media companies sued defendant bond holders and their related entities for breach of contract and interference with
economic relations, alleging defendants caused the default of and liquidation of plaintiffs' entities by breaching confidentiality agreements and interfering with pending contracts. Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion, which the trial court granted. The appellate court reversed, concluding plaintiffs' claims arose out of commercial speech and conduct and therefore fell under the Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17 exemption to the anti-SLAPP statute. Judge Bosk dissented.
Court of Appeal, 6th District, 2006 (on appeal from Santa Clara Co. Superior Court)
145 Cal.App.4th 1112, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 185
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2008 (on appeal from Ventura Co. Superior Court)
160 Cal.App.4th 1032, 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 268
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2007 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
151 Cal.App.4th 454, 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 839
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 1st District, 2005 (on appeal from San Francisco Co. Superior Court)
169 Cal.App.4th 328, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 480
Plaintiff podiatrist sued baseball player, reporters, and newspaper for defamation arising from statements in a newspaper article. Defendants' anti-SLAPP motions were granted; plaintiff appealed. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that stating facts and opinions about plaintiff was plainly "conduct in furtherance of the exercise of ... [defendants'] constitutional right[s] of free speech" within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4); and since the statements served as a warning against plaintiff's method of self-promotion, and were provided along with other information to assist patients in choosing doctors, the statements involved a matter of public concern. Furthermore, because plaintiff could not prove falsity, and because some of the newspaper's statements were privileged, he did not demonstrate a probability of prevailing on his claims.
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2007 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
150 Cal.App.4th 242, 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 305
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2009 (on appeal from Orange Co. Superior Court)
173 Cal.App.4th 1, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 249
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 5th District, 2007 (on appeal from Fresno Co. Superior Court)
154 Cal.App.4th 1502, 65 Cal.Rptr.3d 641
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2006 (on appeal from Orange Co. Superior Court)
140 Cal.App.4th 821, 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 777
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2001 (on appeal from San Diego Co. Superior Court)
94 Cal.App.4th 1083, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 825
Mendoza sued an insurance company and its agents, Richard and Ina Chavez, asserting numerous contract and tort claims. All claims but
one were dismissed. Subsequently the Chavezes sued Mendoza for malicious prosecution. Mendoza moved to strike the complaint as a
SLAPP. The trial court ruled that a malicious prosecution complaint was not subject to the state's anti-SLAPP statute. The appellate court reversed the ruling, holding that a malicious prosecution complaint is subject to a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute. However, the court also concluded that the Chavezes had demonstrated a probability of prevailing on their complaint and therefore affirmed the trial court's denial of Mendoza's special motion to strike the complaint.
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2007 (on appeal from Orange Co. Superior Court)
148 Cal.App.4th 71, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 600
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2008 (on appeal from Orange Co. Superior Court)
165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 866
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 2nd District, 1996 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
42 Cal.App.4th 628, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 620
The Church of Scientology filed a lawsuit seeking to vacate a multimillion dollar judgment against it. This was part of extensive and
drawn-out litigation (lasting 15 years) by Scientology against Wollersheim. The lower court's granting of Wollersheim's special motion
to strike the complaint is affirmed, with the appellate court holding that the anti-SLAPP statute applies to causes of action arising from any act in furtherance of the right of petition, such as Wollersheim's original successful lawsuit, regardless of the subject matter.
City of Long Beach v. California Citizens for Neighborhood Empowerment
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2003 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
111 Cal.App.4th 302, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 473
City filed a civil complaint against CCNE, alleging violations of the municipal code concerning campaign contributions. The trial
court granted defendants' anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint, holding that the "prosecutorial exemption" in the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply to the complaint and the city had not demonstrated that it was likely to prevail on the complaint. The appellate court reverses on the grounds that the prosecutorial exemption — "enforcement actions brought in the name of the people of the State of California" — applies to civil actions by cities enforcing municipal law. According to the court, the legislative history of the statute indicates a broader intent behind the exemption than is evident from the specific wording. (See also People v. Health Laboratories of North America, Inc., 1st District Court of Appeal, and People ex rel. Lockyer v. Brar, 4th District Court of Appeal.)
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2006 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
135 Cal.App.4th 606, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 632
The City of Los Angeles, on behalf of two of its employees, filed petitions seeking workplace violence protective orders under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8 against animal rights activists. Defendants filed anti-SLAPP motions which the trial court denied, holding that the petitions were exempt as public entity enforcement actions under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16(d).
The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the exemption did not apply because the City filed the petitions as "employer" and not in its capacity as "public prosecutor" the petitions arose from protected free speech activity; and the City failed to demonstrate a probability it would prevail on its claims because (1) the protective orders under section 527.8 can only be brought against natural persons (not ADL), and (2) the City presented no evidence that individual defendant Ferdin conveyed a credible threat of violence in the workplace.
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2007 (on appeal from Riverside Co. Superior Court)
155 Cal.App.4th 1582, 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 862
(Case summary in progress.)
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2001 (on appeal from San Diego Co. Superior Court)
86 Cal.App.4th 384, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 269
The City and the partnership that owns the San Diego Padres baseball team filed preemptive suits against proponents of a ballot
initiative that would have made certain negative findings concerning an earlier city ordinance that authorized funds for construction of a downtown ballpark. Plaintiffs argued that the initiative was invalid and should not be placed on the ballot even if adequate signatures were obtained because the initiative sought to enact measures that were beyond the power of hte voters to adopt. Defendants filed a special motion to strike. The trial court granted summary judgment and ruled that in consequence the SLAPP motion was moot. The appellate court affirms. "Where . . . declaratory relief actions present purely legal questions about the validity of the subject matter of the lawsuits, . . . the SLAPP issue of whether the plaintiffs are more probably than not going to prevail in their actions may appropriately be determined by the use of related summary judgment proceedings."
Court of Appeal, 2nd District, 2005 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
126 Cal.App.4th 43, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 72
Several lawsuits were brought concerning enforcement of initiatives approved by voters in Santa Monica and Pasadena. The initiatives sought to prevent city officials from receiving certain advantages from persons or entities who benefited from decisions made by those officials. Pasadena officials refused to certify the initiative on the grounds that they believed it was unconstitutional. A Pasadena resident filed a petition for a writ of mandate to require the city to certify the initiative; the initiative's sponsor was granted
leave to intervene. The city filed a cross-complaint against the sponsor seeking a judicial declaration that the city had no duty to
certify the initiative under the law. The sponsor filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the cross-complaint, which the trial court denied. The appellate court reverses on the grounds that the cause of action in the cross-complaint arose from protected First Amendment activity and the city was not able to demonstrate the required probability of succeeding on the cross-complaint.
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2008 (on appeal from Santa Barbara Co. Superior Court)
159 Cal.App.4th 262, 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 921
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2009 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
170 Cal.App.4th 1280, 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 24
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 1st District, 2006 (on appeal from San Francisco Co. Superior Court)
137 Cal.App.4th 1166, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 818
| Note! Opinion superseded by California Supreme Court's granting of petition for review on June 21, 2006 (S143087). |
Plaintiffs filed suit against Sierra Club, alleging improper distribution of information during an election to the Club's board of directors. The trial court granted Sierra Club's anti-SLAPP motion. The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part. It reversed as to three causes of action which it found were exempt under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17(b) as a public interest action. It also found that one cause of action was not exempt under section 425.17(b) because the claim "seeks relief pertaining specifically to [two named directors] ... [and] the gravamen of a cause of action seeking relief of such a personal kind does not satisfy the public interest criterion of the exemption of § 425.17." The court found that the claim arose from acts protected by the First Amendment in connection with a public issue, and that the uncontested summary judgment in favor of defendant conclusively established that plaintiff had no probability of prevailing.
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2009 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
173 Cal.App.4th 302, 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 24
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2003 (on appeal from Orange Co. Superior Court)
109 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 245
The Securities and Exchange Commission filed a complaint against Colt for "an illegal scheme to manipulate the price of four stocks."
Colt responded to the SEC action by stipulating to a consent decree. After Freedom Communications published stories about the SEC
allegations, Colt sued for defamation and other damages. The trial court granted defendant's anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint,
and the appellate court affirms. The court concluded that, because defendant is immune from liability for the articles under Civil Code section 47 and plaintiff had not offered credible evidence of actual malice, plaintiff had not established a probability of prevailing on the complaint as required by the anti-SLAPP statute.
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 1998 (on appeal from Riverside Co. Superior Court)
66 Cal.App.4th 94, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 600
The neighbors of an apartment complex filed nuisance actions against the owners of the complex after unsuccessful attempts to abate
alleged criminal activity and harassment by residents of the complex. In retaliation, the owners of the complex sued the neighbors for trade libel, defamation, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. When the neighbor-defendants filed a special motion to strike the complaint, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their complaint. The Court of Appeal found that the neighbors were targets of a SLAPP and that SLAPP targets are entitled to an award of attorney fees even if the SLAPP filer withdraws the complaint. "We do not believe," the court said, "the policies behind the SLAPP statute call for any different result."
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2003 (on appeal from Orange Co. Superior Court)
110 Cal.App.4th 26, 1 Cal.Rpr.3d 390
Commonwealth Energy gave Investor Data a list of Commonwealth's shareholders. After Investor Data used the list to market its services
to the shareholders, Commonwealth sued for a variety of business-related causes of action. Investor Data filed an anti-SLAPP motion, denied by the trial court. The appellate court affirms. The court points out that, because the speech alleged to be the cause of
action (Investor Data's pitch to Commonwealth's investors) did not occur within an official proceeding, the decision whether Investor
Data's statements are protected by the anti-SLAPP statute depends entirely on whether the statements were made in connection with a
public issue (following the standard announced by the California Supreme Court in Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope and Opportunity). The court holds that a sales pitch for a commercial service does not qualify as a public issue for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. (See the earlier case, Rivero v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, 1st District Court of Appeal.)
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2001 (on appeal from Riverside Co. Superior Court)
93 Cal.App.4th 993, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 625
After a failed attempt at merger between ComputerXpress and a business owned by defendants, defendants posted statements about
ComputerXpress on the internet and filed a complaint against ComputerXpress with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
ComputerXpress sued, alleging in nine causes of action that defendants had conspired to damage its reputation and cause it economic harm. The trial court denied defendants' motion to strike the entire complaint on the grounds that none of the causes of action fell under the anti-SLAPP statute. The appellate court noted that the nine causes of action were based on three distinct sets of facts: (1) statements made in private business transactions, (2) the internet postings, and (3) the SEC complaint. The court concluded that statements made in the internet postings and SEC complaint fell under the anti-SLAPP statute, whereas the statements made in private business transactions did not. Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether plaintiff can demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the causes of action subject to the anti-SLAPP statute. In addition, the court ruled that defendants should be considered the prevailing party on the SLAPP motion, notwithstanding their partial success, and thus are entitled to attorney fees and costs incurred by the motion.
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 1999 (on appeal from Orange Co. Superior Court)
70 Cal.App.4th 1446, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 443
A candidate for public office sued his rival, alleging defamation in the rival's campaign statements. The appellate court upholds the trial court's granting of a special motion to strike the complaint. Plaintiff was a public figure and thus required to prove malice to prevail on a claim of defamation; he failed to demonstrate to the court's satisfaction a probability of prevailing on his claim, as
required to defeat the special motion.
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2003 (on appeal from Orange Co. Superior Court)
107 Cal.App.4th 595, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 191
Consumer and consumer advocate sued a manufacturer of herbal supplements, alleging false advertising and other causes of action for
the company's claim that its herbal supplement enlarged women's breasts. The appellate court affirms the trial court's denial of the
company's special motion to strike the complaint. Defendant had not shown that its commercial speech was protected by the state's
anti-SLAPP statute and in any event plaintiffs had demonstrated a probability of prevailing on their claims.
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2007 (on appeal from Orange Co. Superior Court)
152 Cal.App.4th 1043, 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 434
(Case summary in preparation.)