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Padres L.P. v. Henderson
(2004, 4th District – 114 Cal.App.4th 495, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 584)
The owners of the Padres baseball club filed claims for malicious prosecution against attorney Henderson arising from a series of lawsuits Henderson had filed challenging actions taken by the City of San Diego, in collaboration with the Padres, to develop a new baseball park. Henderson filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike all claims. The trial court dismissed claims based on one of Henderson’s lawsuits (plaintiffs had conceded the claim was time-barred) and denied the special motion to strike the claims based on other lawsuits filed by Henderson. The appellate court reverses in part. The court holds that no absolute privilege applies to Henderson’s filing of the lawsuits against the Padres (and thus distinguishes City of Long Beach v. Bozek, California Supreme Court, 1982). The court concludes, however, that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated the requisite lack of probable cause in support of two of their three claims for malicious prosecution.

Paglia & Associates Construction, Inc. v. Hamilton
(2023, 2d District – 98 Cal. App. 5th 318, 316 Cal.Rptr.3d 592)

Paiva v. Nichols
(2008, 6th District – 168 Cal.App.4th 1007, 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 838)

Panakosta v. Hammer Lane Management, LLC
(2011, 3d District – 199 Cal.App.4th 612, 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 835)

Paredes v. CREDIT CONSULTING SERVICES, INC.
(2022, 6th District – 82 Cal. App. 5th 410)

Park v. Nazari
(2023, 5th District – 93 Cal. App. 5th 1099)

Park 100 Investment Group II, LLC v. Gregory R. Ryan
(2009, 2d District – 180 Cal.App.4th 795, 103 Cal.Rptr.3d 218)

Pasternack v. McCullough
(2015, 4th District – 235 Cal.App.4th 1347, 186 Cal.Rptr.3d 81)
(appealed, 4th District – — Cal.Rptr.3d —)

Patel v. Chavez
(2020, 2d District – 48 Cal.App.5th 484, 261 Cal.Rptr.3d 829)

Paterno v. Superior Court
(2008, 4th District – 163 Cal.App.4th 1342, 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 244)

Paul for Council v. Hanyecz
(2001, 2d District – 85 Cal.App.4th 1356, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 864)Paul was a candidate for city council. He sued defendants, alleging that they interfered with his candidacy by contributing to an opponent in a manner that violated the state’s Political Reform Act. Defendants filed a special motion to strike the allegation. They effectively conceded the illegal nature of their method of campaign contributions, but argued that their campaign money laundering was nevertheless “in furtherance” of their First Amendment rights, and thus was protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court granted the motion. The appellate court reverses, holding that such illegal activity is not a valid exercise of constitutional rights as contemplated by the anti-SLAPP statute. (See also The Governor Gray Davis Committee v. American Taxpayers Alliance.

Paul v. Friedman
(2002, 2d District 95 Cal.App.4th 853, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 82)Former clients sued Paul, a securities broker, alleging fraud, negligence, and violation of securities laws. Paul was completely vindicated in an arbitration proceeding; in addition, the court awarded sanctions against the plaintiffs for filing a “frivolous claim for which there was no factual foundation.” Paul then sued his former clients and their lawyer, Friedman, for malicious prosecution and a variety of other causes arising from Friedman’s investigation of Paul during the arbitration proceeding and disclosure of personal information. Friedman filed a special motion to strike the complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, on the grounds that the investigation and disclosure of information were related to “an issue under consideration or review” in the arbitration proceeding. The trial court granted Friedman’s motion to strike all tort and contract claims but refused to strike Paul’s claim that Friedman has breached a confidentiality agreement reached at the commencement of arbitration for the earlier lawsuit. In a complex decision the appellate court rules that Paul’s tort and contract claims cannot be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute since Friedman had not met his burden of proof, i.e., he had not made the required prima facie showing that Paul’s claims arose from activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.

Paulus v. Bob Lynch Ford, Inc.
(2006, 6th District – 139 Cal.App.4th 659, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 148)Lynch brought an anti-SLAPP motion to strike Paulus’s action for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and intentional interference with contract. The court granted the motion and awarded Lynch attorney fees and costs. Paulus appealed. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that Paulus failed to make a prima facie showing of lack of probable cause for his malicious prosecution claim. The court further found that Paulus had made no independent factual or legal arguments regarding the merits of his other claims in the trial court, nor had he specifically addressed the matter in his opening brief, and thus deemed Paulus to have abandoned any challenge to the order striking those two claims.

Pech v. Doniger
(2022, 2nd District – 75 Cal.App.5th 443, 290 Cal.Rptr.3d 47)

People v. Health Laboratories of North America, Inc.
(2001, 1st District – 87 Cal.App.4th 442, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 618)The district attorneys of two counties sued the manufacturer of a weight-loss product, alleging that advertising claims violated various state statutes. Defendant filed a special motion to strike, arguing that the action was prosecuted to chill its exercise of free speech. Defendant acknowledged that the anti-SLAPP statute expressly does not apply to an enforcement action brought by a district attorney (Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (d)), but challenged the constitutionality of this exclusion. The trial court denied the motion and the appellate court affirms, holding that the exclusion does not violate the “equal protection” clause of either the U.S. or California constitutions.

People v. McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.
(2014, 1st District – 228 Cal.App.4th 1382, 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 496)

People ex rel. 20th Century Insurance Co. v. Building Permit Consultants, Inc.
(2000, 2d District – 86 Cal.App.4th 280, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 71)An insurance company sued a company that assisted individuals in preparing estimates of damages from an earthquake. Plaintiff alleged that defendants arranged with homeowners to artificially increase the estimates on the condition they receive up to 50 percent of the insurance payments. Defendants filed a special motion to strike, arguing that the estimates were prepared in anticipation of litigation and therefore were exercises in the right of petition. The trial court denied the motion and the appellate court affirms. “At the time defendants created and submitted their reports and claims, there was no ‘issue under consideration’ pending before any official proceedings.”

People ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rubin
(2021, 4th District – 66 Cal.App.5th 493, 280 Cal.Rptr.3d 858)

People ex rel. Fire Insurance Exchange v. Anapol
(2012, 2d District – 211 Cal.App.4th 809)

People ex rel. Lockyer v. Brar
(2004, 4th District – 115 Cal.App.4th 1315, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 844)The state attorney general filed a complaint against Brar to obtain an order to stop Brar from filing lawsuits under the state’s unfair competition law. Brar moved to strike the complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeal dismisses the motion as friviolous inasmuch as the anti-SLAPP statute, by its own provisions, does not apply to actions brought by public prosecutors.

People ex rel. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Rubin
(2021, 4th District – 72 Cal.App.5th 753)

People ex rel. v. Strathmann v. Acacia Research Corp.
(2012, 4th District – 210 Cal.App.4th 487, 148 Cal.Rptr.3d 361)

Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP
(2005, 1st District – 133 Cal.App.4th 658, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 31)This case arose from the collapse of a fraudulent investment scheme. Plaintiffs — investors who lost millions and a bankruptcy trustee representing entities that were used to perpetrate the scheme — sued defendant law firm for conduct which allegedly helped advance the fraudulent scheme. The trial court denied defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion. The appellate court reversed in part, finding the motion should have been granted in part because plaintiffs’ claims were partially based on positions the firm took in court, or in anticipation of litigation with the SEC, and some plaintiffs did not establish a probability of prevailing. Specifically, the court concluded the bankruptcy trustee’s claims on behalf of one entity were barred by the doctrine of unclean hands and the investors’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations.

Personal Court Reporters, Inc. v. Rand
(2012, 2d District – 205 Cal.App.4th 182, 140 Cal.Rptr.3d 301)

Pfeiffer Venice Properties v. Bernard
(2002, 2d District – 101 Cal.App.4th 211, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 647)A landlord notified tenants to vacate their parking spaces for construction. The tenants association encouraged tenants to send the landlord a letter protesting that they could be forced to vacate their parking spaces only after a “legal process.” In the aftermath, two of the landlord’s locks were broken. The landlord sued the tenants association and certain tenants for damages on a variety of claims. Defendants filed a demurrer and notified the plaintiff of their intention to file a special motion to strike the complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. On the eve of the deadline to file the anti-SLAPP motion, the plaintiff dismissed all but two individual defendants, and shortly thereafter filed an amended complaint. The trial court dismissed the case under the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex (the law does not concern itself with trifles) and thus did not conduct a hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion. Defendants filed a motion for attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP statute; the motion was denied on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction. Held on appeal: “the trial court has jurisdiction to award attorney fees to a prevailing defendant whose SLAPP motion was not heard solely because the matter was dismissed before defendants obtained a ruling on the SLAPP motion.”

Pfeiffer Venice Properties v. Superior Court
(2003, 2d District – 107 Cal.App.4th 761, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 400)

Philipson & Simon v. Gulsvig
(2007, 4th District – 154 Cal.App.4th 347, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 504)

Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine v. Tyson Foods, Inc.
(2004, 1st District – 119 Cal.App.4th 120, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 926)Plaintiff brought an action for unfair business practice under Business & Professions Code § 17500, alleging that Tyson made false and deceptive representations about its chicken products sold in California. Tyson filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that the cause of action arose from Tyson’s exercise of its right of free speech “in connection with a public issue”. The trial court granted the motion on the grounds that plaintiff failed to demonstrate a probability of success on its claims. The appellate court reverses on the grounds that Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17, enacted while the appeal was pending, applies to the case. Section 425.17 provides that the anti-SLAPP motion to strike a complaint cannot be applied to “any cause of action brought against a person primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or services, … arising from any statement or conduct by that person,” as long as certain conditions are met. Moreover, section 425.17 contains a retroactivity clause that operated as a repeal of the trial court’s order.  (See also Brenton v. Metabolife International, Inc.)

Planned Parenthood Golden Gate v. Foti
(2003, 1st District – 107 Cal.App.4th 345, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 46)Plaintiff filed an action for declaratory relief, asking the court to apply to defendants an earlier injunction limiting demonstrations outside its clinic. The trial court denied defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion on the grounds that defendants had waived protection of the anti-SLAPP statute by stipulating that the present action could be filed. The appellate court affirms the denial. Held: the question whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies in this case became moot once the trial court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment because in denying summary judgment the trial court impliedly found that plaintiff had demonstrated a probability of prevailing on its claim.

Platypus Wear, Inc. v. Goldberg
(2008, 4th District – 166 Cal.App.4th 772, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 95)

Plumley v. Mockett
(2008, 2d District – 164 Cal.App.4th 1031, 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 822)

Pott v. Lazarin
(2020, 6th District – 47 Cal.App.5th 141, 260 Cal.Rptr.3d 631)

Prediwave Corporation v. SImpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP
(2009, 6th District – 179 Cal.App.4th 1204, 102 Cal.Rptr.3d 245)

Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Insurance Guarantee Association (“Premier Medical I”)
(2006, 2d District – 136 Cal.App.4th, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 43)Defendants petitioned the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) to determine whether plaintiff was improperly representing treating physicians in WCAB proceedings. Plaintiff sued, alleging that the defendants were engaged in anticompetitive activity. Arguing that the complaint was based entirely on the defendants’ constitutional right to petition the WCAB, defendants filed a special motion to strike the complaint. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the constitutional right to petition includes the basic act of seeking administrative action.

Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Insurance Guarantee Association (“Premier Medical II”)
(2008, 2d District – 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 695)

Price v. Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3
(2011, 3d District- 195 Cal.App.4th 962; 125 Cal.Rptr.3d 220)

Public Employees’ Retirement System v. Moody’s Investors Service, Inc.
(2014, 1st District – 226 Cal.App.4th 643, 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 238)

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