Evan Mascagni and Mark Goldowitz
In D’Arrigo Bros. of California v. United Farmworkers of America, D’Arrigo sued UFW for breach of contract. UFW moved to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP law, but the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, UFW argued that the case arose from its protected petitioning activity and that D’Arrigo could not show a probability of prevailing in the action.
First Prong: UFW’s Protected Petitioning Activity
UFW has represented D’Arrigo’s agricultural employees in Salinas Valley since the union was certified in 1977 (over D’Arrigo’s opposition) and has had repeated legal disputes with D’Arrigo since then. In 2010, UFW filed two charges of unfair labor practices with the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB), alleging D’Arrigo had “initiated a de[c]ertification campaign against the [UFW].” While the ALRB decision was pending, D’Arrigo brought this suit against UFW for breach of contract, alleging that UFW had breached its promises in a letter to D’Arrigo by “pursuing, and assisting the ALRB general counsel in pursuing[,] allegations that D’Arrigo had unlawfully promised benefits to employees.” The Court of Appeal concluded that “[t]his alleged conduct unquestionably constituted statements made in connection with an issue under consideration by the ALRB in an official adjudicatory proceeding authorized by the ALRA.” Thus, the Court held that UFW met its burden to show that D’Arrigo’s lawsuit arose from protected activity.
Second Prong: Plaintiff’s Probability of Prevailing
On the second prong of the anti-SLAPP statute, the Court of Appeal held that D’Arrigo could not prevail because interfering with the duty of the ALRB to enforce the Agricultural Labor Relations Act (ALRA) would be contrary to the public interest in protecting the right of agricultural employees to negotiate the terms of their employment. The Court noted that “UFW had no obligation, either under the terms of the contract or as a matter of public policy, not to cooperate in the [ALRB] General Counsel’s independent investigation and prosecution of the ULP [unfair labor practice] complaint.”
It its decision, the Court discussed an amicus brief filed by the ALRB in support of UFW in this case. “As the General Counsel points out in her amicus brief, ‘Without the cooperation and assistance of the percipient witness, the General Counsel will be unable to determine whether sufficient facts exist to warrant the issuance of a complaint and will be powerless to protect the rights of agricultural employees established by the ALRA.’” The Court then quoted at length a portion of the amicus brief discussing the practical implications of D’Arrigo’s argument:
If parties were free to agree to withhold necessary information concerning unlawful employment practices, the General Counsel would have to resort to a much more frequent use of its subpoena powers to force these witnesses to testify and would incur the additional burden of having to seek enforcement of the subpoena in superior court.
The Court of Appeal found the ALRB’s General Counsel’s position “convincing” and adopted her reasoning, holding that D’Arrigo was unable to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on its breach of contract claim.
Importance of Decision
Jeffrey Demain from Altshuler Berzon LLP represented UFW. He told CASP, “The Court of Appeal’s thoughtful decision reaffirms the fundamental public policy that people shouldn’t be hauled into court, where they are exposed to costly and intrusive discovery and other legal proceedings, and potentially subject to damages liability, for cooperating with criminal or civil law enforcement authorities. That is a legal principal at the heart of what the anti-SLAPP law is all about.”
This isn’t the first time that the Sixth Appellate District has issued an opinion supporting the First Amendment rights of unions. In Monterey Plaza Hotel v. Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Local 483, 69 Cal.App.4th 1057 (1999), an early appellate decision under the anti-SLAPP statute, a hotel sued a union alleging defamatory statements by a union official in a news report of a labor dispute at the hotel. The trial court granted the union’s special motion to strike the complaint and the appellate court affirmed, holding that plaintiff was unable to establish a prima facie case of slander in its pleadings.
More recently, in 2012 the Sixth District held that participation in a city administrative process (in which defendant opposed use of a disputed parcel as a public access road) is protected activity under the anti-SLAPP law. See M.F. Farming Co. v. Couch Distributing Co., Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 180.