Yesterday, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, issued a published decision denying Tri-City Healthcare District’s (“the District”) anti-SLAPP motion. While the District claimed that their alleged misconduct arose from hospital peer review proceedings that were protected speech under 425.16(e)(1) and (e)(2), the Court disagreed and held that an individual seeking judicial relief from an administrative body’s decision did not amount to an exercise of the administrative body’s free speech and was thus not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. Because the case had a complex procedural history that the Court of Appeal called “convoluted”, I will focus specifically on the 425.16 substantive analysis of the opinion.
John Young, the plaintiff in this case, was a cardiopulmonary surgeon that held special privileges in his field at the District’s hospital. Starting in 2006, Young began having conflicts with fellow practitioners and District administrators about the adequacy of the standard of care provided by Young. After several administrative procedures, the District ultimately terminated Young’s staff privileges for inappropriate care that was below the District’s standards. After exhausting his appeals, Young filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate in 2009.
In his fifth cause of action, the only claim relevant for anti-SLAPP purposes, Young claimed that his suspension was unjustified, based on improper review of his records, carried out by unqualified committees, and unsupported by substantial evidence, and thus, it should be vacated. The District filed an anti-SLAPP motion, claiming that Young’s attempt to compel a hearing on the validation of his suspension arose out of protected free speech conduct, in the hospital peer review context. Citing San Ramon Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. Contra Costa County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 343, several times throughout its discussion, the Court held that “even if the conduct of individual public officials in discussing and voting on a public entity’s action or decision would constitute an exercise of rights protected under the anti-SLAPP statute[,]…this does not mean…litigation challenging a public entity’s action or decision always arises from protected activity. [Citation] An act of governance mandated by law, without more, is not an exercise of free speech or petition.”
Additionally, distinguishing this case from Kibler v. Northern Inyo County Local Hospital District, (2006) 39 Cal.4th 192, in which plaintiff sought damages on tort theories, the Court noted that the claim in this case stemmed from avoidance of fair procedure or Young’s judicial review hearing rights and did not seek any damages. The Court ultimately held that Young was “principally seeking judicial relief from actions of an administrative body that denied him a hearing to which he was otherwise entitled, and those actions are independent from any protected elements of the claims. The anti-SLAPP statute should not be interpreted to impose an undue burden upon Young’s right of petition for court review of administrative action that was in the nature of governance.”
Read the full opinion here.